Water Law Review
Volume 3

Issue 1

Article 6

9-1-1999

The 1969 Act's Contributions to Local Governmental Water
Suppliers
David F. Jankowski

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/wlr

Custom Citation
David F. Jankowski et al., The 1969 Act's Contributions to Local Governmental Water Suppliers, 3 U. Denv.
Water L. Rev. 20 (1999).

This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Denver Sturm College of Law at
Digital Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Water Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital
Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu.

THE 1969 ACT'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO LOCAL
GOVERNMENTAL WATER SUPPLIERS
DAVID F. JANKOWSKI, DAVID C. TAUSSIG, AND AUSTIN C.
HAMREt
I.
II.
HI.

IV.
V.

The 1969 Act's Focus On Water Development ................... 21
22
Nature And Significance Of Public Water Suppliers .......
Benefits Of The 1969 Act To Local Water Suppliers ........... 23
A. Basin-Wide Water Right Adjudication ............................ 23
B. The Definition Of "Appropriation" ........................24
1. Compliance with Anti-Speculation Requirements ......... 24
2. Elimination of the Diversion Requirement ................. 25
26
C. Changes Of Water Rights .................................................
D. Plans For Augmentation And Exchanges ........................ 27
31
E. Reasonable Diligence ........................................................
F. Reuse Of Transmountain And Developed Water ............ 33
34
G. Right To Refill Storage Vessels .........................................
Disadvantages Of The 1969 Act To Local Water Suppliers ... 36
36
A. The Can And W ill Doctrine .............................................
38
B . Exem pt Wells .....................................................................
38
Conclusion ........................................................................

In 1969, the Colorado legislature enacted the Water Right
Not
Determination and Administration Act ("the 1969 Act").
coincidentally, the 1960s saw the beginning of the explosive
population growth that has nearly doubled the state's population since
the 1969 Act became law. As an inevitable result of that growth, public
water suppliers throughout Colorado, especially those on the Front
Range, became leading proponents of the principles and procedures
in the 1969 Act, as they raced to develop and manage water rights
portfolios to supply hundreds of thousands of new Coloradans each
decade.
This article explores the 1969 Act, and significant
amendments to the 1969 Act,' from the perspective of local public

I The authors are partners of the firm of White & Jankowski, LLP, in Denver,
Colorado, where they represent numerous local governmental water suppliers. The
views expressed in this article are those of the authors only, and are not necessarily
those of their clients.
1. Like any important and comprehensive legislation that has survived for thirty
years, the 1969 Act has been amended to address newly-identified concerns, and
simply to correct what could be called errors and omissions by the 1969 legislature.
Those amendments are now so intertwined with the 1969 Act itself as to require no
small effort to distinguish them. Given that the amendments are critical to an
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water suppliers; addresses ways in which those suppliers have relied on
the 1969 Act to develop and protect the water supplies necessary to
meet the sometimes staggering demands of Colorado's population
growth; and explores some of the benefits and disadvantages of the
1969 Act to public providers.!
I.

THE 1969 ACT'S FOCUS ON WATER DEVELOPMENT

The 1969 Act arose from distinguished ancestry. Colorado has had
laws regulating the determination and administration of water rights
since 1879.' Though the ancestral irrigation acts differed significantly
from the 1969 Act in many ways, they promoted the same fundamental
purpose-the development of the state's water supplies for beneficial
use by the public. In furtherance of this purpose, the 1969 Act
declares the state's policy "to maximize the beneficial use of all of the
waters of the state. ' Though the 1969 Act and amendments for the
first time provided protection of stream flows and lake levels, codified
restrictions against waste, and defined and proscribed water right
speculation, nothing in the 1969 Act or interpretive decisions is
contrary to its original, fundamental purpose. Given that public water
understanding of Colorado's process for adjudicating and administering water rights,
it is essential to include them here when appropriate to this discussion.
2. This article does not address S. 5, Colorado's legislation regulating the use of
nontributary groundwater, which is largely codified at COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-90-137
(1999). This legislation has unquestionably been particularly important to public
water suppliers located in areas along the Front Range that lack reliable surface
supplies.
Neither does the article discuss the 1965 Colorado Ground Water
Management Act, which has long been important to rural public water suppliers in
Eastern Colorado, and whose importance to public suppliers generally is increasing
along with Colorado's population.
3. Laws regulating the use of water were first enacted by the territorial legislature
in 1861. Act of Nov. 5, 1861, § 1, 1861 Colo. Sess. Law 94 (the state legislature enacted
a reasonably comprehensive statute which created a nascent system for adjudicating
priorities for irrigation within certain water districts). See Act of Feb. 19, 1879, 1879
Colo. Sess. Law 94. Legislation after 1876 was founded on the Colorado Constitution,
under which water is owned by the state, for the use of the people by appropriation.
COLO. CONST. art. XVI, §§ 5, 6.
4. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-102(1) (a) (1999). The term "waters of the state" was
itself broadly defined by the 1969 Act to maximize the 1969 Act's application. See
COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-103(13) (1999). Many Colorado Supreme Court decisions
have endorsed maximum use as an essential purpose of the Act. See, e.g., Consolidated
Home Supply Ditch & Reservoir Co. v. Town of Berthoud, 896 P.2d 260, 271 n.12
(Colo. 1995) ("[Our system of prior appropriation is based on a strong public policy
that water, a scarce and valuable resource, should be put to its maximum beneficial
use"); State Eng'r v. Castle Meadows, Inc., 856 P.2d 496, 505 (Colo. 1993); Fellhauer v.
People, 447 P.2d 986, 994 (1968) (noting that the policy of maximum utilization is
implicit in the Colorado Constitution).
5. See Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 37-92-102(3), 103(4) (1999), regarding stream flow and
lake level protection; Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-92-103(3) (a) (1999), regarding speculation;
and Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-92-502(2)(a) (1999), regarding waste. The Colorado
Supreme Court has said that maximum utilization must be implemented to ensure
that water resources are utilized in harmony with other valuable state resources. City
of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Dist., 926 P.2d 1, 86 (Colo. 1996) (citing State Eng'r v.
Castle Meadows, Inc. 856 P.2d 496, 505 (Colo. 1993)). This embellishment of the
maximum use doctrine does not alter the Act's essential focus.
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suppliers are, first and foremost, water users and developers, the 1969
Act's focus on water development has been critical to its successful use
by water suppliers.
H. NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF PUBLIC WATER
SUPPLIERS
Public water suppliers, as the term is used in this article, are local
governments that provide water supplies, including cities and towns,
counties, and special districts.6 Whether the local government in
question is a general purpose governmental agency, or whether its sole
function is to provide water supplies to its customers, there is little
dispute that providing reliable and safe water supplies has historically
been and remains a crucial local governmental function upon which
millions of Coloradans depend.
The importance of local governmental water providers has
ascended with the size of Colorado's population. Colorado's water
judges observing local governmental litigants before them, especially
those on the Eastern Slope, may, at times, feel as though the litigants
are a branch of municipal government. That local suppliers have
assumed this role is unsurprising given their inherent stability as public
corporations, their power to plan for orderly growth and development
within their respective utility service areas, and their power to finance
water development and distribution projects to meet that growth
through their taxing and bonding authority. No less significant to the
expanding role of local governments as water suppliers is the public's
expectation that local governments will fill that role at a low cost,
along with the difficulties associated with private water supply
development for public use, including sometimes thin profit margins
and anti-speculation rules that favor public over private water
developers.
As a result, although the 1969 Act was not written for the purpose
of promoting local governmental water use, one can fairly say that
Colorado's rapid urbanization since 1969 has necessarily made the
1969 Act an indispensable tool for local governments, especially
general and special purpose municipal governments, to meet the water
supply demands of their new customers. Hence, local governments
have been among the chief beneficiaries of the 1969 Act, and have
found its purpose and the majority of its substance to be consistent
with their need for providing safe and reliable water supplies to their
customers.
6. For cities and towns, see Colo. Rev. Stat. § 31-15-708; §§ 31-35-401 and -402
(1999); and the Colorado Constitution, article XX, § 6. For counties, see Colo. Rev.
Stat. § 30-35-201(15)-(20), (26)-(28) (1999); and the Colorado Constitution, article
XVI, § 16. For special districts, see Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 32- 4-401 & 37-45-101 (1999) et
seq. Water conservancy districts may also provide such a function. See COLO. REV.
STAT. §§ 37-45-101 to 37-48-195 (1999).
7. Compare City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 926 P.2d 1, 37-40 (Colo.
1996), with Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. Vidler Tunnel Water Co., 594
P.2d 566, 568 (1979). See also infra Part III.B.1.
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H. BENEFITS OF THE 1969 ACT TO LOCAL WATER SUPPLIERS
A.

BASIN-WIDE WATER RIGHT ADJUDICATION

The benefits of the 1969 Act's establishment of basin-wide
adjudication' of water rights are not unique to local governments.
Under the 1969 Act, Colorado was divided into seven water divisions
along major river basin boundaries. 9 Within each division, one water
judge, with the assistance of water referees,"° is assigned to hear and
decide all applications for water rights." Notice of all water right
applications throughout each division is provided monthly by the
resume notice system, which was also created by the 1969 Act. The
resume notice is binding on all those who receive it whether or not
they elect to participate against an application . 12
Unlike its
predecessors, the 1969 Act also created a continuing system of
adjudication of water rights, allowing filing of water right applications
at any time, without the need to await the initiation of periodic
adjudications of all water rights in a given water district. 3 While the
pace of progress of complex water applications can seem interminable
to litigants, conclusion of individual applications occurs much more
rapidly than under preexisting adjudication acts.14 The ongoing,
basin-wide system of adjudication, coupled with the binding effect of
resume notice, promote the ability of local governmental water
suppliers to plan for the acquisition of water rights in an orderly
fashion, and provide an important degree of stability critical to local
governmental suppliers whose development of adjudicated water
rights will require years, if not decades, of effort.
By the same token, the 1969 Act also allows local governmental
providers who have confirmed water rights to protect those rights by
opposing later, potentially harmful, water right applications. Resume
notice of applications within water divisions provides a sure means for
water users to remain aware of competing applications for water rights,
and the liberal standing provisions of the 1969 Act assure access to the
water court to allow protection of one's rights against such
applications.' 5 Public suppliers have generously relied on the 1969 Act
8. The 1969 Act also provides for basin-wide administration of water rights by
division engineers, acting as direct subordinates of the state engineer.
9. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-201 (1999).
10. Some water judges also have "back-up" judges to help handle overloaded
dockets and potentially deal with cases in which the waterjudge may have a conflict.
11. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-203 (1999).
12. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-302(3) (1999). As to the binding effect of resume
notice, see, e.g., State Eng'r v. Smith Cattle, Inc., 780 P.2d 546, 551 (Colo. 1989)

("Upon receipt of adequate notice the engineers were bound by the water court's

order whether they chose to appear or not").
13. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-302(1) (1999).
14. For example, the supplemental adjudication in Water District 7, Case No.

60052, decreed on May 13, 1936, began on May 13, 1915.
15. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-302(1)(b) (1999) ("any person" may oppose a
water right application).
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for opposing applications by other public and private water users.
B. THE DEFINrrION OF "APPROPRIATION"
1.

Compliance with Anti-Speculation Requirements

A water right is created in Colorado by appropriation, 6 defined as
the "application of a specified portion of the waters of the state to a
beneficial use."' 7 An appropriation may not, however, "be held to
occur when the proposed appropriation is based upon the speculative
sale or transfer of the appropriation rights to persons not parties to the
proposed appropriation."" While public suppliers are prohibited from
appropriating water rights for speculative purposes, important legal
differences allow governmental appropriators greater flexibility in
complying with the anti-speculation rule than enjoyed by private water
developers.
Under the express terms of the 1969 Act, an appropriation is
speculative:
if the purported appropriator of record does not have either a legally
vested interest or a reasonable expectation of procuring such interest
in the lands and facilities to be served by such appropriation unless
such appropriatoris a governmental agency or an agent in fact for the persons
proposed to be benefited by such appropnation.

Since local governments appropriate vast amounts of water for
customers, and not for lands and facilities in which they have or will
secure an interest, this exemption is critical to such appropriators. A
private appropriator may benefit from this exemption, but only if
acting on behalf of a governmental appropriator or other end user.
Furthermore, under ordinary circumstances, one may appropriate
for the anticipated future use of others only if the appropriator is in
privity of contract or has an agency relationship with the intended user
of the water sought for appropriation. ° The strict requirements of
Colorado River Water Conservation District v. Vidler Tunnel Water Co. do
not, however, apply to municipal appropriators, or arguably, to other
governmental agencies making appropriations to meet a proven need
for water within established service areas.' In City of Thornton v. Bijou
Irrigation Co., the Colorado Supreme Court, citing the statutory
exemption, refused to apply the requirements of firm contractual

16. COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 6; COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-82-101 (1999).
17. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-103(3) (a) (1999).
18. Id.
19. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-103(3) (a) (I) (1999) (emphasis added).
20. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. Vidler Tunnel Water Co., 594 P.2d
566, 568 (Colo. 1979).
21. City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 926 P.2d 1, 40 (Colo. 1996). When a
municipal supplier is seeking to make an appropriation for sale outside its service area,
however, traditional anti-speculation requirements do apply.
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commitment or agency relationship to municipal appropriations for a
municipality's service area.2 Rather, the court held that, under the
exemption, "a municipality may be decreed conditional water rights
based solely on future needs, and without firm contractual
commitments or agency relationships" so long as the amount of the
conditional appropriation is consistent with the reasonably anticipated
needs of the municipality." The supreme court's application of the
exemption allows municipal and presumably other public
appropriators to plan for and acluire water rights to meet future
demands within their service areas.
2.

Elimination of the Diversion Requirement

Before 1973, the definition of "appropriation" required "a
diversion of a certain portion of the waters of the state and the
application of the same to a beneficial use."25 A 1973 amendment to

the 1969 Act eliminated the diversion requirement from the
definition, requiring the appropriator only to plan to "divert, store, or
otherwise capture, possess, and control a specific quantity of water for
specific beneficial uses. 2 1 Under this definition, local governments
may control water within the natural course of a stream to maintain a
certain level of water flow within the stream. In recognition of the
growing public awareness of and demand for the maintenance of
stream flows for aesthetic and recreational purposes, local
governments have applied for rights to maintain water within stream
channels. 8

22. Id. at 38.
23. Id. at 39 (ultimately holding Thornton demonstrated its need over a planning
period of fifty years); see also City & County of Denver v. Sheriff, 96 P.2d 836 (Colo.
1939).
24. Though the statutory exemption in Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-92-103(3)(a)(II)
(1999) applies only to public appropriators or those acting on an appropriator's
behalf, the precept that one may appropriate to meet one's own reasonably
anticipated needs probably also applies to private appropriators claiming water rights
to meet their own needs, and not for sale to others. Since local governmental
appropriators, by definition, appropriate for use by their customers (with the
exception of appropriations for direct benefit of public facilities), however, this
provision of the 1969 Act creates a particularly significant benefit to such
appropriators.
25. COLO. REv. STAT. § 148-21-3(6) (1963 & Supp. 1969).
26. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-103(3) (a) (II) (1999).
27. City of Thornton v. City of Fort Collins, 830 P.2d 915, 930 (Colo. 1992). Fort
Collins protected a flow of water in the Poudre River Recreational Corridor. This is
not to suggest that the 1969 Act absolutely bars a public appropriator from claiming,
without further "control," an instream flow for a proper purpose. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 3792-102(3) (1999) states that the Colorado Water Conservation Board is vested with the
"exclusive authority" to appropriate the waters of natural streams and lakes to
maintain minimum flows or levels as may be required "to preserve the natural
environment to a reasonable degree." Under this section, it is arguable that local
governments may appropriate instream flows or lakes levels fulfilling other legitimate
governmental purposes even if they may have the effect of preserving the natural
environment.
28. Cases No. 98CW448, Division 1 (application of City of Golden); 94CW273,
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CHANGES OF WATER RIGHTS

Most of Colorado's major rivers have long been "overappropriated" by senior water rights for irrigation and other
purposes.' Even Colorado's oldest local governments, however, are
faced with a formidable need to supplement existing raw water
supplies to meet current and anticipated population growth. Many
newer Colorado local governments are just getting into the race, more
than 100 years after streams became over-appropriated. By acquiring
and changing large amounts of senior agricultural water rights to use
for municipal and other beneficial purposes, these governments have
attempted to meet these needs.
The 1969 Act did not invent the right of Colorado water users to
change water rights to uses for which they were not originally
appropriated; the right has long been embodied in the law.3 The
1969 Act did, however, establish comprehensive standards and
processes for changing water rights. Before the 1969 Act, the only
change of a water right that could be formally adjudicated was a
change in point of diversion. 3' The 1969 Act significantly broadened
the definition of "change of water rights" allowing adjudication of all
water rights changes, both absolute and conditional, including all
important changes of the type and place of use of senior rights.2 In
doing so, the 1969 Act incorporated the common law proscription
against changes that would result in material injury, extending the
protection to owners and users of vested water rights and decreed
conditional rights, 3 while expressly allowing the applicant for a change
of water right to propose terms and conditions to prevent such injury.
While water users seeking to make changes of water rights must
now undergo what may be an onerous water court process before they
may lawfully apply senior agricultural rights to new municipal uses, the
salutary result of the process is permanent decreed protection for the

Division 1 (application of City of Littleton and South Suburban Parks and Recreation
District); and 93CW86, Division 2 (decree of City of Pueblo). See also 83CW327,
Division 1 (application of South Platte River Greenway Foundation, Inc., a private
foundation, which was later withdrawn.) While these applications were to maintain
water levels in stream channels, there appears to be no legal reason why a local
government could not seek a water right to maintain a water level in a public lake, so
long as the requisite degree of control could be demonstrated under COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 37-92-103(3) (a) (II) (1999).
29. See, e.g., City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 926 P.2d 1, 102 (Colo. 1996);
Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy Dist. v. City of Florence, 688 P.2d 715, 716
(Colo. 1984).
30. SeeStrickler v. City of Colorado Springs, 26 P. 313 (Colo. 1891).
31. The earliest statutory recognition of the right to change a point of diversion
was enacted in 1899. Act of Apr. 6, 1899, ch. 105, 1899 Colo. Sess. Laws 429; See New
Cache La Poudre Irrigation Co. v. Water Supply & Storage Co., 68 P. 781 (Colo. 1902).
32. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-103(5)* (1999) (broadly defining "change of water
right"); COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-302(1) (1999) (permitting the filing of water court
applications to adjudicate such changes).
33. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-305(3) (1999).
34. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-305(4) (1999).
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new changed uses. 5 Changes of water rights also include changes of
conditional water rights.3 6 Conditional water rights have great value to
governmental appropriators, who must initiate and adjudicate water
rights long in advance of actual need to meet the demands of
reasonably anticipated growth. While those appropriations are based
on reasonably anticipated needs, it is to be expected that such needs
will be refined over planning periods of forty or more years. It is
undoubtedly beneficial to municipal appropriators to have the ability
to change conditional water rights to adapt to changing conditions, so
long as they do not injure other water users in the process.
The 1969 Act's incorporation of broad standards and convenient,
if sometimes costly, processes for changes of water rights has promoted
the stability of water markets and the ability of local governments to
rely on the acquisition and change of senior water rights. Given that
many municipalities, even those that originated in pioneering times,
are late-comers to significant water right acquisition, this is one of the
1969 Act's principal benefits to public water suppliers.
D. PLANS FOR AUGMENTATION AND EXCHANGES
Plans for augmentation and exchanges37 permit junior water rights
to divert water out-of-priority while ensuring the protection of senior
water rights. Exchanges and plans for augmentation work best on
tightly regulated and heavily appropriated but well-watered stream
systems. 38 Not surprisingly, their proliferation has largely been an
Eastern Slope phenomenon3 9 driven by growth along Colorado's Front
Range. In the thirty years since the 1969 Act's adoption, local
governments coming to over-appropriated streams have increasingly
turned to plans for augmentation and exchanges as valuable water
management tools to supplement and fully implement portfolios of
expensive changed senior irrigation rights ° and foreign water."
Although exchanges had been recognized by statute in 189742 and
35. See Farmers High Line Canal and Reservoir Co. v. City of Golden, 975 P.2d 189
(Colo. 1999). This rule does not, however, protect water users who may expand or
otherwise additionally change water rights after a change decree is obtained. Id. at
202-03.
36. City of Thornton v. Clear Creek Water Users Alliance, 859 P.2d 1348, 1359 n.9
(Colo. 1993). The Alliance included a number of municipal water users. See id. at
1349 n.1.
37. It can be difficult to distinguish between the two. See generally Michael D.
White, Water Exchanges: A New Fracas East of the Divide, BASIN & PLANNING
MANAGEMENT-WATER QUANTITY & QUALITY 8 (1993).

38. John U. Carlson, Exchange of Water and Water Rights-A Summary of ColoradoLaw,
Water Transfer in Colorado: Part of the Solution or Part of the Problem? 5 NAT. RES. LAW
CENTER & BOULDER COUNTY BAR ASs'N 8-9 (1991).
39. For a rough tabulation of the number of plans for augmentation and
exchanges (1969-1992) see White, supra note 37, at 7-8.
40.
41.

See discussion supra Part III. C.
See discussion infra Part III.F.

42. Act of Apr. 9, 1897, ch. 58, 1897 Colo. Sess. Laws 176 (codified at COLO. REV.
STAT. §§ 37-83-101 to -104 (1999)). Section 4 of the law authorized reservoir owners
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in 1899,"3 could be operated so long as other water uses were not
injured," and could be judicially protected by injunction, 5 the law did
not provide for the adjudication of exchange priorities until 1969.46
Until then, approval and oversight of exchanges was assigned to the
state engineer.4 7 In 1969, the legislature allowed adjudication of
priorities for existing exchanges in S. 105, which, though enacted
concurrently with the 1969 Act, was not a part of it.48 In addition to
allowing for adjudication of absolute exchanges, section eight of S.
10549 recognized a spectrum of exchanges wider than previous
legislation, allowing significant flexibility and creativity in devising and
operating exchanges. Authority to adjudicate conditional rights of
exchange followed in 1981, when S. 31 was enacted, extending to the
water courts jurisdiction for adjudicating both conditional and
absolute exchanges.52

to deliver stored water to downstream ditches, and in exchange, to take an equal
amount less stream loss as determined by the state engineer. Id. at 177.
43. Act of Apr. 6, 1899, ch. 105, § 3, 1899 Colo. Sess Laws 236 (codified at COLO.
REv. STAT. § 37-83-105 (1999)). Section 3 of the law, enacted as part of legislation
authorizing the adjudication of change in points of diversion, provided for the
notification of the water commissioner and the allowance of a temporary exchange or
loan of water between ditches for irrigation purposes in order to save crops. Id.
44. Ft. Lyon Canal Co. v. Chew, 81 P. 37, 40 (Colo. 1905).
45. King v. Ackroyd, 66 P. 906, 908 (Colo. 1901).
46. Windsor Reservoir & Canal Co. v. Lake Supply Ditch Co., 98 P. 729, 734 (Colo.
1908) (arguing that the question of exchanges of water between the same and
different owners of ditches or reservoirs has no place and is "wholly foreign" in a
general adjudication proceeding establishing priority rights).
47. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-83-101 to -105 (1999). This historical assignment of
exchanges to the direction and determination of the state engineer explains why he
still maintains substantial control over operation of exchanges. See City of Denver v.
City of Englewood, 826 P.2d 1266, 1273 (Colo. 1992) ("[The statutes] give the division
and state engineers significant responsibilities.")
48. Act of June 7, 1969, ch. 370, § 8, 1969 Colo. Sess. Laws 1192, 1196-97.
Consistent with prior exchange history in Colorado, the rights of substitution or
exchange authorized in Section 8 were included in the act dealing with the state
engineer. Id. See William A. Hillhouse, II, Integrating Ground and Surface Water Use in
an AppropriationState, 20 ROCKYMTN. MIN. L. INST. 691, 702-03 (1975) (noting that S.B.
105 was one of seven water bills under consideration in the Senate).
49. § 8, 1969 Colo. Sess. Laws at 1196-97 (codified at COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 37-80120(1)-(4) (1999)).
50. COLO.REv. STAT. §§ 37-83-104 to -105 (1999). These sections, which are still in
effect, were the pre-1969 statutory bases for exchanges.
Unlike the broad
authorization of the 1969 legislation, they allow only two types of exchange operations.
Id.
51. Act of Apr. 24, 1981, ch. 432, 1981 Colo. Sess. Laws 1786. Section 1 added "or
approval of a proposed or existing exchange of water under Section 37-80-120 or 3783-104" (codified at COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-302(1)(a) (1999)). Id. Section 2 was
added to grandfather in applications for existing exchanges so that original
appropriation date(s) could be awarded an antedated priority date, unless the priority
was contrary to the manner the exchange was administered. Id. (codified at COLO.
REV. STAT. § 37-92-305(10) (1999)).
52. Prior to that time, "Colorado water law apparently did not provide for the
adjudication of exchanges." City & County of Denver v. United States, 935 F.2d 1143,
1150 (10th Cir. 1991) (citing COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 148-6-1 to -5 (1963), repealed and
re-enacted COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 37-83-101 to -104 (1999)). "It was only with the 1981
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Unlike exchanges, plans for augmentation were a creation of the
1969 Act. The 1969 Act defined the term "plan for augmentation" as a
"detailed program to increase the supply of water available for
beneficial use in a division or portion thereof' by various means.53
Like exchanges, plans for augmentation could be adjudicated in the
newly created water courts.'
In addition, the 1969 Act created a
procedure by which the state engineer could give administrative
approval for operation of temporary plans for augmentation and
exchanges, but that authority has since been repealed with respect to
plans for augmentation.55
With the statutory privilege of operating and adjudicating
exchanges or plans for augmentation comes the corresponding duty to
protect water users56 by: (1) preventing injury and impairment to water
rights;" and (2) providing a substitute water supply that is adequate,
amendments to the Water Right Determination and Administration Act, and in
particular Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-92-302(1)(a), that provisions for judicial approval of
such exchanges through the filing of a water rights application were adopted." Id. But
see In the Matter of the Application of the City & County of Denver, for Findings of
Due Diligence, in Douglas, Arapahoe, Denver, Adams, and Jefferson Counties (Dist.
Ct., Water Div. No. 1, Colo. 1999) (No. 96CW145), where the water court has ruled
contrary to this holding.
53. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(9) (1999). The definition may be of some utility
in distinguishing an augmentation plan and an exchange for some purposes, City of
Florence v. Board of Waterworks, 793 P.2d 148 (Colo. 1990), but may be of little useful
value because "new water need not be injected to give life and validity to a plan for
augmentation." Kelly Ranch v. Southeastern Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 550 P.2d
297, 303 (Colo. 1976).
54. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-302(1)(a) (1999).
55. Act ofJune 7, 1969, ch. 373, § 1, 1969 Colo. Sess. Laws 1200, 1212. (formerly
codified at COLO. REV. STAT. § 148-21-23 (1963) & COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-307
(1973); repealed by S.4 (1977), ch. 483 § 6, 1979 Colo. Sess. Laws 1704.). On the
other hand, exchanges can still be operated on an administrative basis pursuant to
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-80-120 (1999) without a decree. Many municipal water suppliers
have chosen to adjudicate both their exchanges and plans for augmentation to take
advantage of integrating them into Colorado's priority system and protecting other
surface rights on the stream systems with decreed terms and conditions to compensate
for depletions. Some users, however, still rely on approval of temporary augmentation
plans said to issue under the authority of the State Engineer's Office. For example,
"GASP," a temporary plan approved annually on the South Platte River since the early
1970's, has never been adjudicated. In the Arkansas River Basin, however, both
agricultural and municipal users have taken seriously the responsibility to augment
depletions as a result of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Kansas v.
Colorado, 514 U.S. 673 (1995) finding that Colorado's heavy well-pumping had
violated the Arkansas River Compact (COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-69-101 to -106 (1999)).
56. These protections have not, however, been extended to protect alleged injury
to a wastewater discharger's permit. City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 926 P.2d
1, 89-102 (Colo. 1996).
57. COLO.REV. STAT. § 37-80-120(4) (1999) ("Whenever substitute water is supplied
to a senior ditch, the supplier or his designee may take an equivalent amount for
beneficial use from the waters of the state of Colorado to the fullest extent possible
without impairing the availability of water lawfully divertible by others."); COLO. REV.
STAT § 37-92-305(3) (1999) ([A] plan for augmentation, including water exchange
project, shall be approved if such ... plan will not injuriously affect the owner or users
of a vested water right or decreed conditional water right."); COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92305(5) (1999) ("In the case of plans for augmentation including exchange, the
supplier may take an equivalent amount of water at his point of diversion or storage if
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both58 for quality and quantity, to meet the seniors' requirements of
use. On their face, these broadly defined restrictions protect water
users from the effects of diversions and the provision of substitute
supplies under plans and exchanges." Furthermore, because plans for
augmentation and exchanges are operated on a daily basis, through
advance notification and approval of the state engineer's office, 60 there
is a continuing obligation to prevent injury or impairment of water
rights and to meet the downstream seniors' requirements regarding
quality and quantity of the substituted water each time the exchange is
operated.6 '
Though these statutory restrictions govern the operation of all
plans and exchanges, much attention has recently been given to their
application to what may be called "water quality exchanges." In such
exchanges, upstream diverters claim the right, by exchange or
augmentation, to make diversions of high quality water by providing
downstream diverters with a substitute supply comprised of
conventionally treated municipal wastewater effluent." When the
upstream junior diverter attempts to do so, enormously important
questions as to public health and the applicability and scope of the
above restrictions are raised." These questions have been and are still
such water is available without impairing the rights of others.") It should be noted
that, though the authority to adjudicate absolute exchanges was added by S. 105,
COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-305(5) was enacted as a part of the 1969 Act.
58. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-80-120(3) ("Any substituted water shall be of a quality
and continuity to meet the requirements of use to which the senior appropriation has
normally been put."); COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-305(5) (1999) (" Any substituted water
shall be of a quality and quantity so as to meet the requirements for which the water of
the senior appropriator has normally been used ....
").It has been held that "[t]he
statutory scheme governing water exchange proposals places a clear limitation on the
'discharge' aspect of all exchanges-i.e., the provision of the substituted supply of
water." Bijou IrrigationCo., 926 P.2d at 92.
59. Given that exchanges and plans allow out-of-priority operations in
contravention of Article XVI of the Colorado Constitution, it is not surprising that the
legislature thought it necessary to impose such comprehensive conditions on their
operation.
60. City & County of Denver v. City of Englewood, 826 P.2d 1266, 1273-74 (Colo.
1992).
61. Bijou Irrigation Co., 926 P.2d at 97 (emphasizing the state engineer's continuing
duty to ensure that the quality standards of the substituted water be met at the point of
discharge to ensure protection to downstream seniors).
62. See generally Michael D. White, Water Quality Exchanges, 39 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L.
INST. 19 (1993). In cooperation with senior agricultural rights, a number of cities have
made exchange arrangements. To compensate for the poorer quality of water, cities
will often give those agricultural interests additional water, sometimes contribute
money, and may agree to water quality standards. See, e.g., City of Northglenn with
Farmers Reservoir and Irrigation Co. in 1976; City of Thornton with Water Supply and
Storage Company in 1986. See also Bijou Irrigation Co., 926 P.2d at 95-97. The treated
effluent is generally sufficient for agricultural purposes and allows the junior
municipality to divert cleaner water higher on the stream.
63. Permits to discharge pollution to the stream under the Clean Water Act, 33
U.S.C. § 1251 (1994) et seq., are obtained in Colorado through procedures and
standards established under the Colorado Water Quality Control Act. See COLO. REV.
STAT. § 25-8-101 (1999) et seq. Such permits do not address the permitee's right to use
the discharge as a substitute supply, a determination that is the responsibility of the
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being fought over in the Division 1 water court.14
The benefits of plans and exchanges to local governmental
providers cannot be underestimated. Local governmental suppliers
have been leading advocates of plans and exchanges in the water
court, for they represent a flexible and creative way to maximize
existing supplies, often without the need to spend additional public
funds on the acquisition and change of additional senior water rights
or on the construction of new diversion and storage facilities. By the
same token, the protection against harmful exchanges and plans
which is offered to owners and users of competing water rights by the
statutes is vital to allow local governmental suppliers to assure that
other's exchanges and plans will not harm their own interests. Given
that local governmental suppliers are in the business of providing
potable water supplies, the express protection from water quality injury
or impairment provided by the statutory scheme is of particular
importance to such suppliers.
E. REASONABLE DILIGENCE
The 1969 Act, for the first time, mandated biennial applications to
be filed in the water courts for findings of reasonable diligence 6 to
continue conditional water rights.6
Prior to 1969, diligence
water court under the existing statutory scheme.
64. One such case was 83CW361, Water Division 1, where the City of Golden's
proposal to provided treated wastewater effluent as a substituted supply to municipal
diverters was denied on water quality grounds. Another such case is 96CW145, Water
Division 1, an application by the Denver Water Board, which is pending.
65. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-92-301(4) made it mandatory for owners of conditional
water rights to file for biennial findings of reasonable diligence. Although initially this
biennial showing could be viewed as burdensome, as diligence laws have evolved,
especially with the 1990 amendments the benefits of diligence law outweigh the
detriments for municipal suppliers.
66. The concept of "reasonable diligence" first developed as a required element in
the first step for the initiation of a conditional water right, enabling the appropriator
to invoke the relation back doctrine. See Fruitland Irrigation Co. v. Kruemling, 162 P.
161, 163 (Colo. 1917) ("[T]he right acquired by diversion and application of water to
beneficial use may, with the aid of proper diligence, relate back to the first substantial
act of the appropriator.., frequently spoken of as the first step."). Most early water
rights were made absolute by diverting the water from the stream and applying it to
use prior to adjudication. As more complex projects developed however, the courts
created the relation back doctrine issuing interlocutory decrees which allowed the
priority date to relate back to the initiation of the appropriation if the claimant could
show the project was being developed with reasonable diligence. Dallas Creek Water
Co. v. Huey, 933 P.2d 27 (Colo. 1997). For example, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 148-10-6 (1963)
subsection (1) required claimants to offer proof with respect to partially completed or
perfected appropriations in the same manner as the claims and proofs for completed
and perfected appropriations; and subsection (2) provided that if it shall appear that
the claimant "...

. has prosecuted his claims of appropriation and the financing and

construction of his enterprise with reasonable diligence under all the facts and
circumstances." Thus, it was in the context of the appropriation of a conditional water
right where the requirement of diligence first arose. Indeed, reasonable diligence is
still a required element in the definition of a conditional water right. See COLO. REV.
STAT. § 37-92-103(6) (1999).
It has been noted that the intent and action
requirements for initiating water rights are mirrored in the diligence test. See also
David C. Hallford, Developments in ConditionalWater Rights Law, 14 COLO. LAw. 353, 356
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proceedings could be considered on adjudication day in every evennumbered year.
In practice, few conditional water rights were
considered or cancelled. Since 1969, the period for filing diligence
applications was extended from two years, to four years, 69 and, finally,
to six years in 1990. ' The 1990 amendment, for the first time, also
defined the term "reasonable diligence"" by essentially codifying the
prior case law," but under a somewhat less stringent standard.
The 1990 amendment also added to the diligence statute several
important principles that benefit local governmental water suppliers.
First, the amendment made clear that, in an integrated project, work
on one feature of the project is considered in determining whether
diligence has been shown in developing various features of the
project. 4 Public suppliers have frequently relied on this provision to
(1985).
67. Procedures to continue conditional water right decrees were first enacted in
1919. Act of Apr. 9, 1919, ch. 147, § 7, 1919 Colo. Sess. Law 493 (codified at COLO.
REV. STAT. § 147-10-8 (1953), COLO. REV. STAT. § 148-10-8 (1963), and eventually
repealed by the 1969 Act). Under this law, in every even numbered year, (i.e., a
biennial requirement) an adjudication day was established for the hearing of further
proof in support of any conditional appropriations for the purposes of showing
reasonable diligence in the prosecution of the completion of the appropriation. Id.
No special notice was given. Id. On adjudication day any appropriator or claimant
may appear to argue for the cancellation, continuation, modification or other
disposition of the conditional right. Id. After hearing the evidence, the court or
appointed referee was to enter its decision within one year. Id. at 493-94.
68. See, e.g., Colorado River Water Conservancy Dist. v. Twin Lake Reservoir &
Canal Co., 468 P.2d 853 (Colo. 1970). In applying this statute, the Court held that
failure to appear at adjudication day for twenty years (1944-1966) did not result in a
prima facie cancellation of the water right. Id. at 855-56. The Court reasoned that
neither the protestant nor other appropriators invoked the remedy of the statute to
cancel conditional water rights. Id. at 855.
69. Act of June 7, 1973, ch. 443, 1973 Colo. Sess. Laws 1523, 1523-24 (codified in
COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-301(4) (1973) (requiring a quadrennial filing for
diligence)).
70. Act of Apr. 13, 1990, ch. 269, § 1, 1990 Colo. Sess. Laws 1625 (codified in COLO.
REv. STAT. § 37-92-301(4) (a) (1990)). In addition, the amendment began the running
of the six-year filing from the month and year of entry of the decree. Darby v. All J
Land & Rental Co., 821 P.2d 297 (Colo. 1991). This eliminated the practice in which
numerous pending diligence applications would be determined in one consolidated
decree.
71. "The measure of reasonable diligence is the steady application of effort to
complete the appropriation in a reasonably expedient and efficient manner under all
the facts and circumstances." COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-301(4) (b) (1999).
72. Diligence proceedings have been, and still are, ad hoc proceedings where the
water court is given broad discretion to consider all relevant factors. Compare City &
County of Denver v. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist., 696 P.2d 730 (Colo.
1985), with Municipal Subdistrict, Northern Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v. Chevron
Shale Oil Co., No. 98SA377, 1999 Colo. LEXIS 857 (Colo. Sept. 13, 1999).
73. For example, "steady application of effort" has been substituted for "project
specific activities" and "reasonably" has been substituted for "most" as to "expedient
and efficient manner" in which the project is to be completed under the
circumstances. See Upper Gunnison River Water Conservancy Dist. v. Board of
Comm'rs, 841 P.2d 1061, 1064, n. 7 (Colo. 1992), which reversed the water court's
premature application of the 1990 amendment to a diligence application pending
before that amendment was adopted.
74. "When a project or integrated system is comprised of several features, work on
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show diligence on various individual parts of the system. Second, the
amendment also made clear that, so long as other facts and
circumstances show diligence, neither economic conditions beyond
the applicants' control, nor the failure to obtain governmental permits
or approvals are a basis for denying a diligence application.75 These
provisions will, like many aspects of the 1969 Act, have their greatest
benefit in diligence proceedings on complex, long-term projects.
Since many local governmental water suppliers must rely on such
projects to meet expanding water demands,16 these provisions have the
potential to be very useful to such suppliers.
F.

REUSE OF TRANSMOUNTAIN AND DEVELOPED WATER

Colorado common law long recognized that appropriators should
be allowed more comprehensive use of "developed"
water that
77
normally would not be available in the stream.
The 1969 Act
codified 8 this tenet and specifically applied it to transmountain water. 79
An importer of transmountain water is allowed to reuse, make
successive uses, or contractually dispose of the return flow from the
first use of transmountain water. These rights arise simply from the act
of importation, regardless of whether the importer has an intent to
reuse at the time the water right is appropriated,80 which contrasts with
rights to reuse water native to a stream system, for which an intent to
reuse, in addition to a specific intent for the initial use, must be in
place at the time the appropriation is made."
one feature of the project or system shall be considered in finding that reasonable
diligence has been shown in the development of water rights for all features of the
entire project or system." COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-301(4) (b).
75. "Subject to the provisions of paragraph (b) of this subsection (4), neither
current economic conditions beyond the control of the applicant which adversely
affect the feasibility of perfecting a conditional water right or the proposed use of
water from a conditional water right nor the fact that one or more governmental
permits or approvals have not been obtained shall be considered sufficient to deny a
diligence application, so long as other facts and circumstances which show diligence
are present." COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-301 (4) (c) (1999).
76. In its recent decision in MunicipalSubdistrict,Northern Colorado Water Conservancy
District v. OXY USA, Inc., No. 98SA475 (Colo. Dec. 13, 1999), the Colorado Supreme
Court may have significantly raised the burden of proof for applicants in diligence
proceedings, including governmental applicants. In OXY USA, the court resolved the
uncertainty left by previous decisions regarding whether an applicant in diligence
proceedings is required to demonstrate that it can and will complete its project, and
whether it has the requisite non-speculative intent to use the water which is the
subject of the diligence application. Though some had thought that compliance with
these standards was necessary only at the time of the original decree, the court
squarely placed the burden on diligence applicants to show compliance with can and
will and anti-speculation requirements in diligence proceedings. For a discussion of
anti-speculation, see the discussion supra Part III.B.1. For a discussion of can and will
requirements, see the discussion infra Part IV.A.
77. See, e.g., Ripley v. Park Center Land & Water Co., 90 P. 75 (Colo. 1907).
78. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-82-106(1) (1999).
79. City & County of Denver v. Fulton Irrigating Ditch Co., 506 P.2d 144 (Colo.
1972).
80. City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co, 926 P.2d 1, 68-69 (Colo. 1996).
81. Water Supply & Storage Co. v. Curtis, 733 P.2d 680 (Colo. 1987). Note
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Section 106 allows reuse of transmountain and developed water
only "to the extent that its volume can be distinguished from the
Local
volume of the streams into which it is introduced."
governmental suppliers can track water through their systems relatively
easily. Return flows to the stream of transmountain or developed
water after irrigation, whether agricultural or municipal, can also be
reclaimed and reused, 2 however, the engineering analyses necessary to
quantify the amount of stream accretion can be complex and
expensive, making reuse less likely to be feasible for a ditch company.
More recently, the Colorado Supreme Court has interpreted the
statute also to mean that failure to exercise the right to reuse does not
result in abandonment of that right, provided the underlying water
right is not abandoned, 3 thus confirming the ability of local suppliers
to remain patient as their systems grow in response to increasing
demands.
Because an acre-foot of reusable water can be stretched farther,
transmountain and other reusable water rights are an important and
valuable resource for a number of municipal water providers,
including Denver, Colorado Springs, Pueblo, Fort Collins, Thornton,
and additional municipalities supplied by the Windy Gap Project.81
Due to environmental and related concerns, few new transmountain
water projects have been pursued in recent years, and those that have
been pursued have not fared well. 85 As Colorado's population
continues to grow, however, further development of transmountain
water supplies may well be unavoidable.
G. RIGHT To REFILL STORAGE VESSELS
Early on in the development of Colorado water law, the Colorado
Supreme Court held that the amount of a storage appropriation was
determined exclusively by the actual capacity of the reservoir, and not

however, that native water that historically has been consumptively used, and
quantified in a change proceeding, as well as nontributary groundwater, are also
treated as fully consumable water for similar reasons: they have not been a part of the
stream on which other appropriators have been able to rely. Williams v. Midway
Ranches Property Owners Ass'n, 938 P.2d 515, 522 (Colo. 1997); Public Service Co. v.
Willows Water Dist., 856 P.2d 829, 833 n.8 (Colo. 1993).
82. Public Service Co. v. Willows Water Dist., 856 P.2d 829, 833 (Colo. 1993).
83. City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co, 926 P.2d 1, 70-71 (Colo. 1996).
84. The original subscribers of the project were Loveland, Longmont, Boulder,
Estes Park, Ft. Collins, and Greeley. Some of these cities have sold all or part of their
interests to other Front Range water suppliers.
85. In the last fifteen years, the following transmountain diversion projects have
suffered setbacks: AWDI's San Luis Valley Project (See American Water Dev., Inc., v.
City of Alamosa, 874 P.2d 352 (Colo. 1994)); the Union Park Project (See Board of
County Comm'rs v. United States, 891 P.2d 952 (Colo. 1995) and decree on remand);
the Two Forks Reservoir Project (See U.S. EPA, REGION VIII, 1990 RECOMMENDED
DETERMINATION

OF TWO FORKS DAM AND RESERVOIR
OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT
(March 1990)); the

TO PROHIBIT CONSTRUCTION

PURSUANT TO SECTION 404(c)

Homestake II Project (See City of Colorado Springs v. Board of County Comm'rs, 895
P.2d 1105 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994)).
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by the intent of the appropriator.6 The Court reached this conclusion
based on its interpretation of the statute then in effect,"7 giving rise to
what became known as the One Fill Rule. That statute was repealed in
1943, however, and the 1969 Act provides no basis for limiting an
appropriation to the volume of a reservoir filled once when the
appropriator intends to store a larger amount. As a result, four times
in the last fourteen years the Colorado Supreme Court has expressly
upheld reservoir refill rights,'s although some vestiges of the One Fill
Rule remain. 9
Under the 1969 Act, and the case law, the size of the storage vessel,
or even the intended size of the vessel does not drive the amount of
the storage right. It is, instead, dependent on volume of water the
appropriator intends to appropriate, and can apply to use. 90 The
capacity of the storage vessel, which usually does not exist at the time a
conditional appropriation is made, is of only collateral importance.
Specifically, the 1969 Act's definition of "storage" makes no
correlation between structure capacity and the amount of water
appropriated. 9' It does, however, expressly authorize storage in
underground aquifers, despite the fact that the capacity of the aquifer
generally imposes no realistic physical constraints on the volume
capable of being stored. In City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co., the
court referred to the One Fill Rule as merely a presumption which is
rebutted by notice of an appropriator's intent to fill and refill. 9
Ninety years ago, when the One Fill Rule came into being, the
draw on reservoirs was to meet an agricultural demand that was
confined to a span of a few months per year. Recent changes in the
86. Windsor Reservoir & Canal Co. v. Lake Supply Ditch Co., 98 P. 729, 733-34
(Colo. 1908).
87. Mills' Ann. Stats., § 2304, cited in Windsor, read in relevant part:
[The court shall] ... make and cause to be entered a decree determining
and establishing the several priorities of right... each according to the time
of its said construction and enlargement, or enlargements or extensions, with
the amount of water which shall be held to have been appropriated by such
constructionand enlargements or extensions, describing such amount by cubic
feet per second of time, if the evidence shall show sufficient data to ascertain
such cubic feet, and if not, by width, depth and grade and such other
description as will most certainly and conveniently show the amount of water
intended as the capacity of such ditch, canal or reservoir,in such decree.
See Windsor, 98 P. at 733 (emphasis added).
88. See City of Aspen v. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist., 696 P.2d 758
(Colo. 1985); Board of County Comm'rs v. Upper Gunnison Water Conservancy Dist.,
838 P.2d 840 (Colo. 1992); City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co, 926 P.2d 1, 27-28
(Colo. 1996), and; City of Grand Junction v. City and County of Denver, 960 P.2d 675
(Colo. 1998).
89. See generally Austin Hamre, When You've Had Your Fill. A Review of the One Fill
Rule, COLO. LAw., Oct. 27, 1998, at 95.
90. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103 (1998); Board of County Comm'rs v. Upper
Gunnison River Water Conservancy District, 838 P.2d 840, 848-49 (Colo. 1992) ("A
conditional water right is established upon the concurrence of an intent to
appropriate water and the performance of overt acts in furtherance of that intent.").
91. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-103(10.5) (1999); see also COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92103(3)(a)(II) (1999).
92. City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co, 926 P.2d 1, 28 n.13 (Colo. 1996).
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traditional One Fill Rule are of real benefit to municipal water
suppliers in meeting a year-round demand for potable water at
reasonable cost, maintaining their drought preparedness, and serving
secondary uses such as wildlife and recreation. From the standpoint of
both economics and conservation of natural resources, it makes little
sense to require more reservoirs or larger reservoirs to be built when
fewer or smaller ones with the right to refill can do the same job.
IV. DISADVANTAGES OF THE 1969 ACT TO LOCAL WATER
SUPPLIERS
Just as the benefits of the 1969 Act are by no means unique to local
governments, the obstacles to water development created by the 1969
Act also affect both public and private water suppliers. Nevertheless,
local governmental appropriators have traditionally been sponsors of
large projects that, if for no other reason than their size, stand to be
affected by difficult and aspects of the 1969 Act and amendments in a
significant way. Consequently, local governmental users view more
difficult aspects of the 1969 Act and amendments as disadvantageous.
A. THE CAN AND WILL DOCTRINE
In 1979, the legislature amended the 1969 Act with the
requirement that, in order to be entitled to a decree, an applicant for
a conditional water right must demonstrate that the claimed water
"can be and will be diverted, stored or otherwise captured, possessed
and controlled and will be beneficially used and that the project can
' The
and will be completed with diligence within a reasonable time."93
Colorado Supreme Court has opined on several occasions that the
purpose of the requirement is " 'to reduce speculation associated with
conditional decrees and to increase the certainty of administration of
water rights in Colorado.' s94
Since its enactment in 1979, the can and will doctrine has been
relied on by opponents perhaps more than any other legal
requirement as the basis for challenging applications for conditional
water rights and for findings of reasonable diligence. Many of the

93. COLO. REv. STAT. 37-92-305(9)(b) (1999). The "can and will" requirement
applies to absolute and conditional water rights, but its application to conditional
water rights has been of far greater importance than to absolute water rights. This
discussion focuses on its application to conditional water rights, under section 37-92305(9) (b) of the Colorado Revised Statutes.
94. Bijou IrrigationCo., 926 P.2d at 42 (quoting FWS Land & Cattle Co. v. State Div.
of Wildlife, 795 P.2d 837, 840 (Colo. 1990) and Board of County Comm'rs v. United
States, 891 P.2d 952, 960 (Colo. 1995)). The statute operates to do so by requiring a
showing that an intended appropriation can and will reach fruition. Id. In this sense,
"can and will" differs from the traditional anti-speculation test embodied in section
37-92-103(3) of the Colorado Revised Statutes, which requires a showing of the
applicant's nonspeculative intent to put water to use for its own purposes. Id. Nothing
in the case law suggests that governmental appropriators will receive different
treatment than private appropriators in proving that they can meet "can and will"
requirements. See, e.g., Bijou IrrigationCo. and Board of County Comm'rs.
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applicants for such water rights have been municipal appropriators.9 6
Some of those applications have failed on "can and will" grounds.
While a municipal appropriator can also rely on "can and will" as a
basis for objection to a competing water project, given that most
growing local governments are likely, at some point, to become
appropriators of new conditional water rights, the requirement can be
fairly viewed as disadvantageous to this class of major water users. That
well-founded applications can survive "can and will" attacks does not
alter that conclusion, especially given the many guises that "can and
will" litigation can assume, and the many terms and conditions that
may be imposed even on a successful water right application as a
result.98 If for no other reason, the cost associated with the intense
litigation of "can and will" makes it a burdensome barrier to a decree.
Given the use of "can and will" to try to frustrate water projects of
local governmental appropriators, and the cost of meeting the "can
and will" burden, such appropriators may fairly ask whether such a
requirement is necessary at the time of the original conditional decree
to reduce speculation. One could argue that requiring an applicant to
offer detailed proof regarding the shape of a final project at its earliest
stage is, itself, an exercise in conjecture. The interaction of the antispeculation
requirements
codified
in
the
definition
of
"appropriation,"9 the other statutory and common law requirements
for adjudicating a conditional water right,"9 and diligence
requirements' can combine, without more, to assure that an applicant
will demonstrate the bonafides of its project at the decree stage and in
later diligence proceedings. The Colorado Supreme Court seems, at
least implicitly, to have recognized this concern in holding that the
"requirement should not be applied rigidly to prevent beneficial uses
where an applicant otherwise satisfies the legal standard of establishing

95. See, e.g., Bijou Irrigation Co., 926 P.2d at 42; Board of County Comm'rs, 891 P.2d at
957; Southeastern Colo. Water Dist. v. City of Florence, 688 P.2d 715, 716 (Colo.
1984).
96. See Florence, 688 P.2d at 716 (where the focus was on the water availability
element of "can and will").
97. Application of the "can and will" requirements calls for proof of several
elements and factors, each of which can be approached in a myriad of ways in a given
matter. See Board of County Comm'rs, 891 P.2d at 960.
98. See City of Thornton v. Biou Irrigation Co. 926 P.2d 1, 42-43 (Colo. 1996).
99. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37 -92-103(3)(a) (1999); see supra Part III.B.1, Compliance
with Anti-Speculation Requirements.
100. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-305(1) (1999). See, e.g., Metropolitan Suburban
Water Users Ass'n v. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist., 365 P.2d 273 (Colo.
1961); Four Counties Water Users Ass'n v. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist.,
414 P.2d 478 (Colo. 1966); City & County of Denver v. Colorado River Water
Conservation Dist., 696 P.2d 730 (Colo. 1985).
101. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-301(4) (1999). As noted in Reasonable Diligence,
supra Part III.E, after the Colorado Supreme Court's decision in OXY USA, an
applicant now plainly has the burden of demonstrating that it is able to meet can and
will requirements in diligence proceedings. Municipal Subdistrict, Northern Colo.
Water Conservancy Dist. v. OXY USA, Inc., No. 98SA475 (Colo. Dec. 13, 1999).
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a nonspeculative intent to appropriate for a beneficial use."'02
Nevertheless, whether viewed through the eyes of an appropriator or
objector, it must be acknowledged that the "can and will" statute has
made, and will likely continue to make, water litigation more
complicated and costly, to the overall disadvantage of local
government appropriators.
B.

EXEMPT WELLS

The 1969 Act allows certain small wells producing 15 g.p.m. or less
to be permitted and constructed free of the adjudication and
administration requirements of the 1969 Act.'
The Colorado
Supreme Court has ruled that, once an application to adjudicate these
"exempt wells" has been filed, the well owners obtain a legally
protected interest in the well subject to administration, and have
standing to oppose water right applications.""
While local
governmental appropriators also have the right to contest applications
for decrees for such wells, it is not reasonable to believe that they will
have the time or resources to contest the hundreds of such water court
applications filed yearly. Consequently, by applying for water rights for
their wells, exempt well owners may obtain the potential to challenge
large water projects by municipal and other appropriators.
V. CONCLUSION
On balance, the benefits of the 1969 Act, and its amendments, to
local governmental appropriators outweigh its disadvantages. A few of
the benefits are exclusive to governmental appropriators, but most are
general to all classes of water users. The frequency with which
municipal and other local governmental appropriators have found it
necessary to rely on the 1969 Act to meet the demands of Colorado's
burgeoning population has made such appropriators among the main
beneficiaries of the principals and procedures established by the 1969
Act.
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